Background: Outpatients receive observation services to determine the need for inpatient admission. These
I n the United States healthcare system, observation is a term used varyingly to describe a billing designation, clinical status, location of care, or model of care delivery for outpatients. Observation is used to manage outpatients for usually less than 24 hours and sometimes up to two midnights to determine the need for subsequent inpatient admission. 1, 2 Observation services are ideal for patients with an uncertain diagnosis warranting further evaluation (e.g., chest pain) or for patients with a clear diagnosis requiring short-term therapeutic interventions (e.g., asthma). 3 Observation visit volume has been increasing: by 2012 there were 1.5 million annual observation stays for Medicare beneficiaries, representing a 300% increase over previous years. 4 From 2010 to 2014, Medicare observation visits increased 8% per year while inpatient stays decreased by 3% per year. 2 This increase may reflect payer cost containment strategy as well as overcrowded hospitals looking for more efficient health care delivery models. By 2050, hospital capacity must grow by 72% to meet projected needs. 5 Observation care is not limited to a specific professional group or hospital location. These services can be delivered by any specialty, with the most common being emergency medicine, internal medicine, family medicine, or surgery. The site of observation service delivery can be the emergency department (ED), an ED-based observation unit (EDOU), an observation unit (OU) outside of the ED, scattered throughout the hospital in traditional "inpatient" ward beds, or a postoperative care unit. 6, 7 An OU is a dedicated area to cohort observation patients, using protocols for evidence-based interventions and disposition endpoints.
Approximately 80% of observation patients originate in the ED. 8 Outcomes are best when observation services are provided in EDOUs by dedicated providers such as emergency physicians. Patients receiving care in an OU staffed by emergency physicians versus alternative specialties experience shorter length of stay (LOS) and improved compliance with condition-specific protocols and are more likely to be discharged home. [9] [10] [11] EDOUs allow for frequent reassessment and quicker disposition, improving efficiency and reducing direct and indirect cost per patient. 7, 12 EDOU care has also been associated with higher patient satisfaction. 13, 14 Despite evidence supporting the use of EDOUs, this is the least utilized model for delivery of observation services. Only one-third of U.S. hospitals deliver observation services in an OU, and just over half of these are EDOUs. 8 One explanation for why the EDOU model has not been widely adopted despite the evidence supporting it is the financial risk to professional groups that staff them. Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) policies predate modern observation care and prohibit professional billing for emergency services and observation services on the same date of service by physicians from the same specialty and same group. 6 When a patient transitions from the ED to an OU on the same calendar date, professional groups that staff both their ED and OU with physicians from the same specialty can only choose one service to bill. They are forced to bill for observation services instead of emergency services as both services are considered bundled into the single observation payment. Alternatively, if physicians from a different specialty (e.g., internal medicine, family medicine) provide the observation service encounter, as seen in hospitals where observation services are provided by non-emergency physicians, then both the ED and the observation encounter can be billed separately. This is the distinction between the "one-service" versus "two-service" models.
Most professional groups that staff EDOUs bill under the one-service model. In this model, the physician or another member of his or her group manages patients in the ED as well as the EDOU. Physician groups will often employ advanced-practice providers (APPs) to help manage observation patients. If the physician personally renders the services defined by these codes, then the role of the nonphysician practitioner (another name for the APP discussed used by Medicare) is to facilitate the care directed by the physician. The APP cannot provide services "incident to" the physician and bill on their behalf without the direct physician interaction. After rounding in the EDOU, the supervising emergency physician returns to the ED to manage new emergency patients, while the APP executes the plan of care.
The two-service model is most commonly used when observation care is delivered outside of an OU in an unstructured manner, scattered throughout inpatient hospital areas. Here the physicians providing emergency services and observation services are from different specialties and both services are individually reimbursed, despite it being the least efficient way to deliver observation care. In rare circumstances, some EDOUs have been able to use the two-service model when 1) the physician providing observation services is from a different specialty (e.g., internal medicine) or 2) the physician providing observation services is an emergency physician from a different group (i.e., an observation group with its own tax identification number). In this model, a physician is not allowed to provide both observation services and emergency services on same date and groups must employ separate physicians for emergency and observation services, which increases the staffing cost. The physician providing observation services cannot provide emergency services at the same time. At some institutions, if the physician delivering observation services also works in the ED, a "washout" period may be required by institutional compliance officers to prevent the instance wherein a physician is delivering observation care to a patient he or she placed in the OU in an attempt to mitigate the appearance of self-referral.
Payer policies and federal laws help explain the origin of the one-service versus two-service model. Enacted in 1989 as part of the Social Security Act, the Stark Law intended to curb fraud and abuse by limiting physician self-referral 15 Stark laws: 1) prohibits a physician from making referrals for certain designated health services (DHS) payable by Medicare to an entity with which he or she (or an immediate family member) has a financial relationship (ownership, investment, or compensation), unless an exception applies; 2) prohibits the entity from presenting or causing to be presented claims to Medicare (or billing another individual, entity, or third-party payer) for those referred services; and 3) establishes a number of specific exceptions and grants the secretary the authority to create regulatory exceptions for financial relationships that do not pose a risk of program or patient abuse. Under this law, a professional group that staffs both the ED and the EDOU is prohibited from billing for both observation services and emergency services on the same calendar date. Stark laws address a potential conflict of interest if the observation services were not indicated and prevent billing multiple times for what could be potentially considered the same clinical encounter. Medicare policy supports this one-service versus two-service distinction 16 "Physicians in the same group practice who are in the same specialty must bill and be paid as though they were a single physician. If more than one (evaluation and management (E&M), or face-to-face) service is provided on the same day to the same patient by the same physician or more than one physician in the same specialty in the same group, only one E&M service may be reported unless the E&M services are for unrelated problems. Instead of billing separately, the physicians should select a level of service representative of the combined visits and submit the appropriate code for that level" 16 . Using EDOUs is financially beneficial to hospitals and patients, but we do not understand the financial implications of staffing these units for emergency medicine professional groups. In this study, we model the annual and daily net financial impact of staffing an EDOU with an emergency physician using the one-service and two-service models at commonly used staffing levels and a range of daily patient encounters.
METHODS

Study Design
For the annual cash flow estimate, we chose specific daily observation patient throughput values and created a Monte Carlo simulation. We built a model based on current clinical practice and inputs gathered from recently available peer-reviewed literature and national survey and payer data. Monte Carlo methods are useful for modeling processes that have uncertainty in inputs, such as salary ranges and professional revenues, to arrive at a final estimate. The Monte Carlo approach has been used in medical research, including analyses of national cost savings generated from increased OU use. 12, 17 Monte Carlo simulation calculates and records the results of many simulated iterations using random values of the input variables in each iteration.
For the daily net cash flow analysis, we selected the mean model input values used in the Monte Carlo simulation without the additional distribution and standard deviation (SD) elements. However, we modeled costs and revenue over a continuous range of daily observation patient throughput from 0 to 35 instead of limiting the analysis to the specific throughput point estimates in our Monte Carlo simulation. We displayed the results graphically, and while this approach does not involve simulation across multiple trials to generate means with SDs, it does offer an alternative method to illustrate key insights of the interaction between patient throughput, staffing levels, and net professional income.
Model Inputs
We illustrate our Monte Carlo simulation model design in Data Supplement S1, Figure e-1 (available as supporting information in the online version of this paper, which is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/10.1111/acem.13452/full). We list explicit model input values and characteristics from the most recent publicly available authoritative sources in the Data Supplement S1, Tables e-1 and e-2. First, to estimate the distribution of ED E&M codes, we used the 2014 Medicare Physician Fee Database. 18 We then modified the distribution to remove and redistribute all instances of codes 99281 and 99282, assuming that patients with these low-level of ED visits would not require subsequent observation care. We chose Medicare data because 1) more recent national allpayer E&M code distributions are not publicly available and 2) this assumption would create a conservative estimate unlikely to bias the visit revenue toward lower values.
Next, to estimate the distribution of observation E&M codes, we used 2016 Relative Value Scale Update Committee data, which captures Medicare Part B data via 2015 national claims data. 19 We removed the "middle day" observation codes 99224 to 99226 because our model is focused on the EDOU model, wherein observation stays spanning 3 or more days are unlikely. We limited our data to Medicare only for the same reasons discussed previously for ED E&M codes.
To translate E&M codes for professional services into estimated revenue, we first attributed total relative value units (RVUs) to each code using the 2017 Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System final rule. 20 We used the Medicare dollar value per RVU using the 2017 Medicare Professional Fee Schedule. 20 We estimated the distribution of primary payer for observation patients using data from the National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, categorizing patients into one of four options: Medicare, Medicaid, commercial, and self-pay. Finally, we weighted payments by payor class relative to Medicare according to commonly accepted industry ratios. [21] [22] [23] We estimated staffing costs using national average salaries for an emergency physician and APP (e.g., emergency medicine physician assistant) using data from 2016 to 2017. [24] [25] [26] We added a benefit premium to determine "fully loaded" hourly staffing cost using common emergency medicine-specific percentages: 12% for an attending physician and 20% for an APP.
27,28 Payroll taxes, malpractice premiums, and health insurance comprise the majority of these benefits.
In the one-service model, we assumed an EDOU with 10 beds, which is a common in hospitals with 30,000 to 60,000 annual ED visits. 29 We used a daily encounter average of nine patients based on common LOS averages, patient arrival patterns, and expected occupancy. We also accounted for patients managed in the OU for short periods of time who do not meet minimum time requirements for observation services (i.e., a patient with an abnormally elevated repeat troponin result 2 hours into the visit who is rapidly transitioned to inpatient care). In a unit this size with low-complexity patients, the physician will provide on average of 2.5 hours of service per day (1-1.5 hours of dedicated rounds and about 1 hour of subsequent work over the rest of the day). The physician will be supported by 12 hours of APP coverage; some units choose not to staff an APP in the EDOU overnight.
Revenue supporting professional services in the EDOU in this model is the difference between observation and ED professional payments.
In the two-service model, we assumed an EDOU with 25 beds and a nurse-to-patient ratio of 1:5 supporting a large hospital with over 80,000 to 100,000 annual ED visits. 29 In this scenario, the transition of care between physicians is similar to an inpatient admission. After the patient is accepted to the unit, a separate observation team writes a comprehensive note that stands alone from the ED documentation. An APP dedicated to the OU is typically present around the clock. Higher volumes of observation patients associated with this model necessitate significantly more dedicated physician and APP time. In our two-service model, we assume 12 hours of physician coverage and 30 hours of APP coverage for daily patient encounters of averaging 24 using the same methodology as the one-service model. Revenue supporting professional services in the EDOU in this model is the entire observation services professional payment.
Study Setting and Population
We studied U.S. adult observation status patients originating from the ED and subsequently managed in an EDOU with care provided by ED professional staff.
Outcome Measures
Our primary study outcome is mean annual net income from professional service revenues and costs associated with staffing an EDOU with an attending emergency physician and APP at specific common daily patient encounter values used in one and two-service staffing models. In our secondary analysis, we modeled daily cash flows over a continuous range of daily patient throughput, up to 35 patients per day to illustrate net profit and loss for professional services.
Data Analysis
We ran 1,000 iterations in the main model simulation and conducted our Monte Carlo study using Crystal Ball software, version 11.1.2.4 (Oracle), which is a spreadsheet-based application suite used within Microsoft Excel. This study is an analysis of publicly available data and was exempt from institutional review board review at our institutions.
RESULTS
Main Model: Annual Net Income
We estimate the mean (AESD) annual net cash flow to be a loss of $315,382 (AE$89,635) in a one-service EDOU ( Figure 1 ) with patient throughput of nine patients per day and a near breakeven net profit of $37,569 (AE$359,583) in a two-service EDOU (Figure 2 ) with patient throughput of 24 patients per day.
Secondary Model: Daily Net Income
In our secondary analysis, we modeled professional cash flows by EDOU patient throughput up to 35 patients per day. In the one-service model (Figure 3) , no breakeven point exists and net loss increases at higher visit volumes. However, the figure illustrates that the loss is minimized near a throughput of 10 patients per day. In the two-service model (Figure 4) , we show an approximate breakeven point that is sustained after a daily throughput over 20 patients.
Sensitivity Analysis
We performed a sensitivity analysis on the simulation model to test the relative effects of adjusting the value and distribution of the variables with the most uncertainty on final estimates. We found that varying the hourly cost of the emergency physician and adjusting the daily throughput of observation patients had the most effect on our outcomes.
Hourly Attending Physician Cost
The average emergency physician cost per hour was $200, varying within a wide range from $141 (Washington, DC) to $300 (Missouri). 26 Since physician costs constitute such a large portion of EDOU staffing expenses, varying the value significantly impacted the net profit or loss in our model. 
Daily Observation Patient Throughput
Since revenue is directly tied to patient throughput, we found that a change of even one or two patients per day could significantly affect outcomes. Our estimates are valid for an established unit running at benchmark daily patient throughput rates of nine patients for a 10-bed EDOU and 24 patients for a 25-bed EDOU in the one-and two-service models, respectively. If daily throughput in the one-service model decreased to eight patients per day, the mean loss increased to $339,187 (AE$91,386). On the other hand, an increase to 10 patients per day decreased the mean loss to $294,871 (AE$95,861). In the two-service model, a decrease in daily throughput to 23 patients creates a mean loss of $50,847 (AE$357,940), while an increase to 25 results in a mean profit of $50,907 (AE$380,448). Facilities using these data to increase revenue by maximizing daily patient throughput may to run into staffing bottlenecks. The cost of additional staff will likely offset the marginal revenue created from the increased patient throughput.
DISCUSSION
Many large national payers do not recognize emergency physician groups for their work in the two distinct settings of the ED and EDOU. A minority of professional groups have created a separate entity to provide observation services. With the use of efficient provider-to-patient ratios, this model can reach a breakeven point when daily billable patient encounters exceed 20. Assuming 5% to 10% of ED visits are eligible for observation care, only the largest hospitals with an annual ED census over 80,000 visits would have a sufficient volume of observation patients to support the two-service model. 29 Professional groups staffing EDOUs in smaller hospitals with lower observation volumes cannot hope to recoup their costs in a one-service model unless a subsidy or alternative equivalent is offered to reach a breakeven point.
Use of EDOUs, when compared to any other observation delivery model, results in higher-quality, lower-cost observation care: a 23% to 38% shorter LOS and a 17% to 44% lower probability of subsequent inpatient admission. 7 EDOUs decrease hospital cost by an average of $1,572 per visit. 12 If all observation services were delivered in EDOUs, the U.S. health care system would save $9.5 billion annually. 7 EDOUs avoid the audit risk of misclassifying shortstay hospitalizations as inpatient visits and create virtual bed capacity for the hospital. When outpatient observation patients are shifted out of beds in inpatient areas into EDOUs, hospitals operating near or at full capacity can backfill those beds with inpatients and their associated inpatient payments. Every observation patient receiving care in an EDOU creates an additional average of $1,506 in indirect facility revenue. 30 By contrast, observation care provided in a scattered fashion by the general medical service loses the facility an average $1,378 per patient. 31 Under the one-service model, groups staffing EDOUs risk an average expected annual loss of $315,382 from inadequate compensation for professional services. However, the analysis is very different for the hospital facility finances where using an EDOU generates annual savings of about $4.6 million. 12 Hospitals may be willing to negotiate a subsidy with professional groups staffing EDOUs to offset their expected annual loss. This is not ideal since professional groups face the specter of periodic renegotiations over the amount of subsidy and may lack the freedom to make independent staffing decisions. We provide model assumptions in Data Supplement S1 to help emergency physician groups calculate their costs and negotiate a fair subsidy.
Professional groups that staff both the ED and the EDOU and want to bill under the two-service model must meet multiple regulatory requirements imposed by CPT, Medicare, Stark law, and local payers. Medicare is the only payer with published national guidelines regarding observation services billing requirements. Professional groups should examine their commercial and government payer contracts for requirements related to observation services and ensure their staffing model and documentation are in compliance. Payer requirements that are unnecessarily burdensome or discordant with patient-centered clinical workflows should be flagged for revision during contract negotiations.
EDOUs using the two-service staffing model may be able to reach a breakeven point at a daily throughput volume of 20 patients or more. This number should be used cautiously as our model reveals a large SD. A hospital backstop agreement may be prudent to prevent financial loss. The two-service model is difficult to implement due to: 1) a scarcity of physicians willing and capable of working solely in the EDOU and 2) ambiguous regulation surrounding establishment of a separate observation group with its own tax identification number, an exercise that increases administrative overhead. Professional groups investigating the use of this model should vet it with local compliance and legal authorities. One strategy for two-service staffing is to leverage physicians with dual training in emergency medicine and internal medicine to staff an EDOU as an internal medicine physician, which qualifies as a different specialty. Lack of dual trained physicians limits the utility of this strategy.
Payer policy should promote EDOUs in both small and large hospitals by allowing professional payment for observation services across specialties and groups for performing the same work. For example, allowing single-specialty professional groups to bill observation services in addition to emergency services would lessen dependence on hospital subsidies. A second, less-optimal policy solution is to ease the administrative burden of establishing a separate group with its own tax identification number.
LIMITATIONS
Our analysis is a simulation model, and it is limited by the accuracy of the inputs. Whenever possible, we chose variables from the most current available sources, but we had to make assumptions where data were unavailable. For example, we used CPT distributions based on Medicare data and generalized it across all payers at the same relative frequencies. Since Medicare beneficiaries are more likely to be older or disabled and/or have a higher number of comorbidities, they would be expected to weigh the distribution toward the higher levels of complexity; this may bias the weighted average payments higher. While our model does adjust revenue for self-pay patients, we do not account for bad debt, which varies by institution and is heavily influenced by collections practices, local patient population characteristics, payer mix, and the prevalence of high-deductible plans. Some commercial payers may allow both emergency and observation professional payments for groups using the one-service model of care. As a result, our findings may not be applicable to facilities with a high proportion of commercial payers, such as freestanding EDs that do not contract with Medicare. But since most EDs contract with Medicare, their observation model is likely to be driven by the most restrictive policies of dominant payers.
Our staffing cost estimates do not include benefits such as retirement contributions or continuing medical education stipends. Local malpractice premium variation could also influence staffing costs. Hourly physician staffing costs vary widely depending on region and our use of national survey data expanded the SD of our mean estimates. Using a two-service model with non-emergency physicians could lower the staffing costs to improve financial viability, but as described previously efficiency differences may mitigate cost savings. Some sites deploy OU staff to perform other duties during times of expected low census such as mid-afternoon. For example, in a one-service model, an APP could review pending microbiology test results at the time of ED patient discharge or staff a fast track area. The additional value created by these activities is not reflected in our model. Rerunning the model using institution-specific staffing cost per hour and hours of coverage would produce more precise estimates.
CONCLUSIONS
Our simulation model for ED observation unit professional fee billing estimates an annual net loss of $315,382 (AE$89,635) in a one-service model and a net profit of $37,569 (AE$359,583) in a two-service model. In the one-service model, staffing costs for professional services significantly exceed payment at all levels of patient throughput, necessitating a hospital subsidy to breakeven. On the other hand, setting up an ED observation unit with a two-service model is cumbersome and limited in scope to the largest of hospitals. Reforms that remove restrictive professional billing practices are needed to encourage hospitals of all sizes to deploy the ED observation unit model, creating long-term value for patients, hospitals, and payers.
